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IN THE SUPREME COURT
of the
STATE OF UTAH
VALERA AMUNDSEN,
Plaintiff and Appellant,
vs.
MUTUAL BENEFIT HEALTH
AND ACCIDEN'T
ASSOCIATION,
Defendant and Respondent.

Case No. 9588

REISPONDENT'S BRIEF
STATEMENT OF FACTS
Respondent accepts, generally, the Statement of
Facts contained in Appellant's Brief except that it
desires to call to the Court's attention that in its
answer, among other matters, the Defendant-Respondent alleged.
"Defendant is without sufficient information on which to form an opinion as to the
truthfulness of the allegations contained in
paragraph 3 (paragraph 3 states that on the
date of decedent's death as aforesaid he was
the owner and named insured of Policy No.
30-60990 as issued by the Defendant, and
in which the Plaintiff was named as beneficiary thereof) ~and alleges affirmatively that
if said policy did exist Defendant has no record thereof, Defendant's records of this date
1
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having been destroyed, Defen·dant having no
mean's by which to show that a policy was ever
issued and if it had been issued whether it
was in force at the time of the insured's death
or whether p~ayment of death benefits was
made."
STATEMENT OF P:O'INTS
POINT I.
THE ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANT'S (RESPONDENT'S) MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT
SHO'ULD BE SUSTAINED.

ARGUMEN'T
POINT I.
THE ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANT'S (RESPONDENT'S) M'OTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT
SHOULD BE SUSTAINED.

It is Respondent's position that, based upon
the pleadings and the policy, that there is no genuine
issue of material fact, and that Respondent is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law, which is a
proper basis for granting a motion for summaty
judgment. Frederick May & Company vs. Dunn,
368 P. 2d. 266, Page 268.
The insuJ'ed .as a matter of law should be chaTged with having failed to exercise due diligence in
obtaining knozeledge of the policy and is therefore,
uegligent ,as a matter of law.
'The case of M~zozz vs. StarukLrd Life and Accident Insur,ance Company, 26 Utah 69, 72 P. 182,
2
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upon which Appellant relies, involved a substantially
different fact situation than is involved in the case
before this Court. In the Munz case, the decedent's
death took place on June 29, 1900. On February 23,
1901, the beneficiary gave the required notice of the
insured's death, a period of almost eight months
later. The Court held that the eight-month interval,
in view of the circumstances, was a reasonable interval in which to submit the proof of loss. In the
case now before the Court the elapsed period of
time between death of the decedent and filing proof
of loss was not eight months but thirty-three 'and a
half years.
In Brown vs. Accident Association, 18 Utah
265, 55 P. 63, quoted in Munz vs. Standard Life q,nd
Accident Insurance Company, 26 Uta:h 69, 72 P. 182,
at page 183, the Court stated:
''Doubtless the purpose of such conditions in such a policy is to afford the insurer
an opportunity within a re'asonable time after
the occurrence to inquire into the cause of the
accident and ascertain the surrounding facts
and circumstances while fresh in the memory
of witnesses, so as to determine whether or
not liability under the contract exists. The
condition in the policy requiring notice to be
given within a specified time with full particulars of the accident operates upon the contract of insurance only after the fact of the
accident. It is a condition subsequent and
must, therefore, receive a reasonable and lib3
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eral construction in favor of the beneficiary
under the contract."
Respondent 'admits that un·der the facts of the
Munz case a reasonable and liberal construction of
the contract was justified and the delay was justifiably excused, but the delay is so grossly extended
in the case at bar that the Court must Say as a
matter of law that the delay was so protracted that
prejudice to the ins~r will be presumed. In the
Munz case the Court stated, at page 183:
"The contr~eting p:arties doubtless intended that notice and proof should be furnished at the earliest practicable time after
the happening of an accident and injury for
which the liability would be claimed, so that
the real facts of the oase could be ascertained
by the insuter before time had effaced them
from the memory of witnesses. The word 'immediate' under such circumstances as are disclosed in this record cannot be construed as
excluding all intervening time between the occurrence of the death and the giving of notice.
It does not by any fair construction of the
policy mean instantly, but 'immedi'ate notice'
means notice within a reasonable time under
all the circumstances of each particular case,
and no doubt ordinarily, unless there are circumstances excusing delay, the notice should
be given at once."
In the case at bar the Respondent, as pleaded
in i~ts Answer, has long ago destroyed its records
of the vintage of the policy under which the Appellant claims. From its own records it cannot prove or
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disprove that (a) a policy issued, (b) it was in force
at the time of the decedent's death, or (c) that the
claim has been heretofore paid. Not only has time
effaced the facts from any of the witnesses, but it
is likely that n1any of the witnesses have been effaced. To hold that the delay of thirty-three and a
'half years in filing proof of loss does not bar the
claimants as a matter of law would be 'an invitation for fraud to be practiced by artful and designing persons. The insurer having destroyed its files
and records cannot dispute a prima facie case, that
is, th'at there was a policy in force at the date of
death and that the beneficiary did not discover the
policy until just prior to filing proof of loss. To
excuse the intervening delay in the instant case
\vould be tantamount to saying that no policy of insurance can be drawn with limitations or conditions
subsequent therein which will ever terminate the
liability of the insurer, and thlat the general statutes
of limitations set up by statute can thereby, be circumvented. This departs from the long standing
rule that except in the case of fraud, the statute of
limitations begins to run from the occurrence of the
event which gives rise to the cause of action. Schmidt
.v. Jlerchants, (N.Y.) 2 N.E. (2) 680, 104 ALR.
This is true regardless of the time of knowledge of
Plaintiff of such right. Golden Eagle vs. lmperator,
93 Wash. 692, 161 P. 848.
~
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Under the facts of the Munz case the ·Court at
Page 184 stated:
"The construction thus put upon the conditions in question secures to the Defendant
every advantage and benefit to which it is
entitled and which was intended by the provisions of the policy."
Under the facts of the Munz case this is so.
But under the facts of this case, the contrary holding to that of the trial court would do violence to
every advantage and benefit to which the Defendant
(Respondent) is entitled, and would further do violence to that which was clearly intended by the written provisions of the policy. It would, in short, be
writing a new contract of insurance for the Plaintiff, which this Court has repeatedly held it can,not do. The risk to the insurer would be substantially increased. In the Munz case the Court stated
a sound rule, at page 184 :
''In such a case, under such circumstances, the beneficiary is not required to do
what 'amounts to an impossibility, but must
perform the conditions subsequent within ·a
reasonable time after obtaining knowledge of
the existence of the policy, or after such knowledge could, by the exercise of due diligence,
have been obtained."
Respondent contends that as a matter of law,
after thirty-three and a half ye'ars, the insured
should be charged with having failed to exercise due
6
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diligence to have obtained knowledge of the policy.
The Provisions of the Policy B.ar Appellant's
Action.
There are four provisions in the policy which
are pertinent to the problem. These are under the
standard provisions. No. 4 states:
"Written notice of injury or sickness on
which claim m'ay be 'based must be given to
the association within 20 days after the date
of the accident causing such injury or within
ten days after the commencement of disability from such sickness. In the event of accidental de.ath immediate notice thereof must
be given to the ~association."
The pertinent part of No. 5 reads as follows:
"Failure to give notice within the time
provided in this policy shall not invalidate any
claim if it shall be shown not to have been
reasonably possible to give such notice, and
such notice was given as soon ··as was reasonably possible.
The pertinent part of No. 14 reads as follows:
"No action at law or in equity shall be
brought to recover on this policy prior to the
expiration of 60 days after proof of loss has
been field in ·accordance with the requirements of this policy. Nor shall such ,action be
bro~tgh tat .all u·nless brought lei thin two years
from the e~1;piration of the time within which
proof of loss is required by the policy."
No. 15 reads:
"If ·any time limitations of this policy
with respect to the giving of notice of the
,...
4
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claim or furnishing proof of loss is less than
that permitted ·by the law of the state in
which the insured resides at the time this
policy is issued, such limitations are hereby
extended to agree with the minimum period
permitted by such law."
'The above provisions are conditions subsequent
which cut off liability of the insurer. A fair construction of them is that if immedilate notice, as required by No. 4, cannot be reasonably given that
the notice will be acceptable if given as soon as
reasonably possible as required by No. 5. However,
No. 14 specifically states that no action in law or
in equity can be brought at all unless brought within two years from the expiration of the time within
the proof of loss is required by the policy. Proof of
loss is required immediately or as soon as is reasonably possible, not thirty-three and a half years later.
In any event, No. 15 states that if at any time
limitation in the policy is extended by the l'aw of
the state (which is not the case in Utah) then such
limitation in the policy is extended to ~agree with
the minimum period permitted by such law. It is
the position of the Respondent that under No. 15,
in no case could the period be extended beyond the
period of six (6) years as set forth in Section 78-1223, U. C. A. 1953 which is the general statute of
limitations applicable to actions based upon written
contracts.
8
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Has the Statute of Limitations Run? If not
Has Appellant Been Guilty of Laches?
An important point to be considered ·here is
whether or not prejudice can be said to have resulted
to Respondent by reason of the delay. Appell'ant's
Brief cites the case of Sanderson vs. Postal Life Insurance Company of New York, 87 Fed. 2d. 58
(CCA 10 Colorado) as authority for the contention
that the staute of limitations does not begin to run
until proof of loss has been filed. The Sanderson
case supra, was discussed in the case of Navigazione
Alta ltalia vs. Columbia Casualty Company, 256
Fed. 2d. p·age 26, where contrary result was obtained. At page 28 and 29 the Court states:
"The arguments presented and the authorities cited by Appellant such as S~anderson
vs. Postal Life Insur~ance Company, lOth Circuit, 87 F. 2d. 58, and Standard Accident Insurance Company vs. Alex~ander, 5th Circuit,
103 F. 2d. 500, are wholly inlapposite, indeed
unrelated to the facts of this case. Without
exception the cases it relies on deal with the
situations in which the failures to comply with
the conditions of the policy consisted of mere
delay in giving notice; a delay from which
no real prejudice resulted. C. F. Young vs.
Traveze,~s Ins~trance Comp.any, 5th Circuit,
119 F. 2d 877 cited and relied on by Appellant, which at page 880 well states the controlling principal here. Pointing out that the
vital question in notice cases is whether prejudice has resulted from the delay, the Court
9
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concluding in a thorough discussion of that
question said of it,
'In its nature it was one to which the
doctrine of prejudice vel non has peculiar
application. There was no prejudice. The notice clause was not breached.'
Respondent here contends that as alleged in its
Answer it is prejudice because of the great lapse of
time. It does not have the records to defend itself.
Suppose that a claimant contended th'at he had not
discovered the policy until after 50 years had elapsed, could any Court still s'ay that his failure to give
notice was excused. Mere long lapse of time will
result in prejudice. This in and of itself is sufficient to establi1s·h negligence by failing to exercise
a right. Prejudice to Respondent must be presumed.
In the ~ase of Schanzenback vs. American Life
Insurance Company (S. Dak.) 237 NW 737, 75
ALR page 1501, the insured died on the 14th day
of February, 1917. The action was commenced on
the 27th day of September, 1926- almost 10 years
after the death of the insured, and the Defendant,
among other defenses, pleaded the statute of limitationls. The policy con!tained a provision that:
"No action shall be m'aintained on this
policy unless brought within 6 years from the
time that the beneficiary or claimant shall
have knowledge of the death of the insured."
The Plaintiff, as in the instant case, had knowledge of the death of the insured, but sought to ex10
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cuse her long delay in bringing the action on the
ground th'at she did not know of the existence of the
policy until the expiration of the six-year period
fixed by the statute of limitations; that therefore,
it was impossible for her to make proof of death
and con1n1ence the action. The Court at page 1503
stated:
"Was the cause of action barre·d? The
action was not commenced with'in the time
limited by the policy, namely within six years
after the death of the insured was known to
the beneficiary. Nor within six years after
the cau'se of action accrued fthe time l'imit
fixed by the statutes) unless as Respondent
contends the cause of action did not accrue
under the terms of the policy until proof of
death h'ad been furnished to the comp,any. A'ppellant urges that the proof of death is a part
of the remedy and that the cause of action accrued on the de~th of the insured. Irrespective of who may be right, both agree that
proof of death must 'be made within 'a re'asonable time after dea:th where, as in this case,
the policy does not fix a time ·limit. It certainly cannot be se1·iously contended that nine
years after death is a reasonable time in which
. to m'ake proof of death, not that three years
is. It is plain that more than six years elapsed
after a rewsonable time to make proof of death
before this action was commenced unless the
peculiar circumstances rendered the delay of
more than nine years re'asonable . . . If the
facts are such that the Respondent ought to
have known she canndt be excused simply because she did not know. We must accept the
11
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verdict of the jury that she did not know. But
that does not meet the issue. The undisputed
facts overwhelmingly show tha:t she ought to
have known. There is no pretext that appellant was guilty of ··any fraud or concealment."
'The Court concluded that whether the cause of
action accrued upon the death of the insured or not
until a reasonable time thereafter alloted to make
proof of death, it accrued much more than six years
prior to the commencement of the action 'and the
cause of action was barred by the statute of limitations.
Relief in justifiable cases of the strict rule of
law at the running of the statute of limitations regardless of whether the chtimant knew of his right
comes from equity. 34 Am. Jur. Sec. 230, page 186.
But equity h'rus a companion doctrine known as
laches. Historically, before there were fixed periods
for commencement of suit, pleas in limitation were
allowed long before there were any statutes on the
subject. Courts applied them upon the theory of a
fiction to the effect that after a long lapse of time
during which the claimant made no asserti.on of
his righ ts the presumption was raised that the obligation had been paid or discharged, and in the case
of real estate that a conveyance had been executed
but lost. 34 Am. Jur. Sec. 2, page 14.
The defense of laches involved, in addition to
mere lapse of time, circumstances from which the
1
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Defend'ant could be prejudiced, "or there must be
such lapse of time that it may be reasonably supposed that such prejt1dice will occur if the remedy
is allowed". 34 Am. Jur. Sec. 5, page 15.
CONCLUSION
Respondent respectfully states that the trial
court's ruling granting Respondent''S Motion for
Summary Judgment must be affirmed because (a)
Appellant Was negligent as a matter of law because
in exercise of reasonable care Appellant should have
discovered the policy, (b) and Appellant failed to
comply with written terms of the policy, and (c)
because the statute of limitations has run, or because of prejudice through lapse of time the doctrine of laches defeats Appell'ant's claim.
Respectfully submitted,
JA~liES

E. FAUS'T
Attorney for
Defendant-Respondent
9·22 Kearns Building
Salt Lake City, Utah
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